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Given that Delliquanti has collaborated
with coauthor David Axe before, it
would be interesting to learn why the
authors picked her for this task.
Coauthors Kevin Knodell and David
Axe are both freelance journalists /
war correspondents. Axe has produced
graphic novels before, most notably
his extremely self-focused, slightly
fictionalized War Is Boring (2010).
Knodell currently produces the Acts
of Valor comic series for Naval History
magazine. Axe provides the preface
to The ’Stan. To his credit, he is quite
candid about his feelings about the war
and his condemnation of the actions of
the United States. His position is strong
enough to raise legitimate questions
regarding The ’Stan’s potential political
agenda, the possibility of cherry-picked
memoirs, pointed sequencing of
stories, and so on. Neither Knodell nor
Delliquanti gets a similar opportunity
to address the reader. This is a missed
opportunity both for The ’Stan and for
Dead Reckoning. Without a preface, the
memoirs would have at least appeared
to stand or fall on their own merit. Had
Knodell and Delliquanti provided their
points of view, either separately or in
conjunction with Axe, questions regarding agendas and biases might be fewer.
It is also understandable that many
readers would want to know more about
how the authors selected the stories and
collaborated on the book. Why were
other stories discarded, if they were?
Delliquanti’s voice potentially would be
more welcome than Axe’s, as she, more
than anyone, brings the memoirs to life.
The ’Stan represents a notable effort.
Although readers’ opinions about its
overall quality will vary, it deserves
an audience. More importantly,
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Dead Reckoning and the U.S. Naval
Institute deserve applause for taking this first step. It will be very
interesting to see what comes next.
RICHARD J. NORTON

Bombs without Boots: The Limits of Airpower, by
Anthony M. Schinella. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2019. 300 pages. $44.99.

In our war colleges, professional
journals, the halls of Congress, and
countless bars and ready rooms, the
argument has been running since the
early twentieth century with Italian
general Giulio Douhet and General
William “Billy” Mitchell, USA. On one
side, advocates of airpower offer a
vision of rapid and potentially low-cost
warfare; on the other, critics assert
that boots on the ground remain the
essential standard of military control.
Anthony Schinella has waded into
this fray and, while unlikely to end
the debate, his book Bombs without
Boots offers a new and thoughtful
discussion of the limitations and utility
of airpower when used without commitment of ground forces. Carefully
constructed and exquisitely sourced,
Bombs without Boots is an exemplar of
what analysis of a thorny and fundamental military issue should look like.
Schinella frames his arguments around
five case studies spanning almost twenty
years: Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999),
Afghanistan (2001), Israel in Lebanon
(2006), and Libya (2011). Schinella
describes, with extraordinary thoroughness, the strategic, geographic, and political situation that confronted airpower
planners in each case. He then explains
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why decision makers chose airpower as
a tool, to what end, and to what effect.
The resulting analysis goes well beyond
the military, ultimately assessing impacts
across the entire strategic spectrum.

importance of strategic patience for the
intervening powers. Time can allow
airpower to enable and shape proxies,
who then can have impact on the
ground in ways that airpower cannot.

Despite the title, ground forces feature
in every case study. Indeed, that basic
observation is central to Schinella’s
argument. In each case study, although
the intervening power focused on using
airpower, that airpower supported
ground forces present at the scene. This
observation holds true even in cases in
which the stated intent of the intervening powers was not to provide support
for any particular faction in the conflict.
Schinella asserts that the goals, behavior,
and effectiveness of these proxies must
be understood to assess fully the impact
of airpower. For example, employment
of NATO airpower in Libya blunted the
Qaddafi regime’s battlefield advantages,
while Libyan geography allowed NATO
airpower to create a de facto sanctuary
where nascent opposition forces could
coalesce. These opposition ground forces
eventually toppled the regime. The
result, he asserts, should be called “a victory made possible by airpower” rather
than “a victory by airpower” (p. 286).

While this book is about airpower, the
specific tools of airpower or the tactical
nuances of its employment consume
little of the volume. This strategic
view serves the reader well, with the
exception that drones—perhaps the
most novel and distinctive application
of airpower in the last two decades—do
not factor into these case studies,
and thus hardly are mentioned.

In cases in which the application of
airpower achieved battlefield success,
Schinella observes that it has been
largely ineffective in giving intervening
powers a voice in what follows the
conflict. Even a successful case of
“bombs without boots,” he suggests, may
require “boots after bombs” to shape the
peace and secure the desired strategic
end state. Across his five case studies,
Schinella observes a strong pattern of
air forces exhausting the fixed targets
associated with an adversary, as well as
available stocks of precision munitions,
early in the conflict. He also notes the

In the end, Schinella concludes that
“airpower interventions can succeed
without committing ground troops—but
only under the right circumstances” (p.
287). Even in these cases, however, “it is
never as easy as you think.” His clear and
thoughtful consideration of how and
when “bombs without boots” can serve
the national interest is why this book deserves a place in the collection of every
professional and strategist tasked with
employing airpower to its full potential.
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In a debate marked by over a century
of passion, this volume is notable for
its objectivity. Schinella’s professional
role as the National Intelligence Officer
for Military Issues within the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence
makes him the most senior official in
the U.S. Intelligence Community who
focuses purely on understanding foreign
military institutions, capabilities, and
operations. He has an insider’s deep
understanding of U.S. and foreign
styles of warfare, while at the same
time he has no allegiance to any
particular military branch or tribe.

DALE C. RIELAGE

2

5/2/19 11:35 AM

